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Abstract—The growing competition drives the mobile network operators (MNOs) to explore adding time flexibility to the traditional data
plan, which consists of a monthly subscription fee, a data cap, and a per-unit fee for exceeding the data cap. The rollover data plan,
which allows the unused data of the previous month to be used in the current month, provides the subscribers with the time flexibility. In
this paper, we formulate two MNOs’ market competition as a three-stage game, where the MNOs decide their data mechanisms
(traditional or rollover) in Stage I and the pricing strategies in Stage II, and then users make their subscription decisions in Stage III.
Different from the monopoly market where an MNO always prefers the rollover mechanism over the traditional plan in terms of profit,
MNOs may adopt different data mechanisms at an equilibrium. Specifically, the high-QoS MNO would gradually abandon the rollover
mechanism as its QoS advantage diminishes. Meanwhile, the low-QoS MNO would progressively upgrade to the rollover mechanism.
The numerical results show that the market competition significantly limits MNOs’ profits, but both MNOs obtain higher profits with the
possible choice of the rollover data plan.
Index Terms—Rollover data plan, Duopoly competition, Time flexibility, Game theory.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
The Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) profit from the
mobile data services through offering carefully designed
mobile data plans. The traditional and most widely imple-
mented data plan is a three-part tariff, involving a monthly
one-time subscription fee, a data cap that is free to use (with
the paid subscription fee), and a per-unit fee for any data
consumption exceeding the data cap. In today’s telecom-
munication market, the most commonly adopted data caps
include 1GB, 2GB, and 3GB [2]. However, the corresponding
subscription fee for the same data cap varies significantly in
different MNOs’ data plans. For example, the subscription
fee of the 2GB data plan is $55 for AT&T subscribers [3],
while it is $35 for Verizon subscribers [4]. The different
pricing decisions mainly result from the MNOs’ market
competition, since different MNOs usually offer different
quality of services (QoS) and experience different costs for
wireless data services [5].
To maintain the competitiveness in the market compe-
tition, many MNOs (e.g., AT&T in the US [6], and China
Mobile in mainland China [7]) have recently adopted the
rollover data plans, allowing the unused data from the
previous month to be used in the current month. Such a
rollover mechanism is more time-flexible than the tradi-
tional mechanism, since it reduces users’ concerns of the
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possible wasting data within the data cap and the possible
overage data consumption above the data cap when the user
cannot accurately estimate his future data demand. Hence,
the rollover data plan is very attractive to the mobile users.
Our earlier study in [8], [9] found that in a monopoly
market with a single MNO, the rollover mechanism can
increase both the MNO’s profit and users’ payoffs, hence
improves the social welfare. That is, a monopoly MNO
should definitely adopt the rollover mechanism. In this
paper, we want to understand whether this is still true
when considering the ubiquitous market competition. In
practice, the four main MNOs in the US market all adopt
the rollover mechanism. In the Europe and Hong Kong,
however, we do not observe all of the MNOs adopting
the rollover mechanism. For example, some MNOs (e.g.,
Orange and China Mobile Hong Kong) are still using the
traditional mechanism without time flexibility. These obser-
vations motivate us to ask the following two key questions
in a competitive market:
Question 1. Will all MNOs offering rollover mechanism become
the equilibrium of the market competition?
Question 2. How will the different data mechanisms change the
MNOs’ pricing competition?
To address the above questions, this paper studies the
MNOs’ market competition in terms of their rollover data
mechanism offering and the pricing strategy. To abstract the
interactions among the competitive MNOs and the hetero-
geneous users, we focus on the two-MNO case (i.e., duopoly
market) in this paper, and we will study the multiple MNO
case (i.e., oligopoly market) in our future work (with some
preliminary discussions in Appendix A). We hope that our
results in this paper could help understand how the com-
petitive MNOs choose their data mechanisms and make the
pricing decisions.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
10
87
8v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
6 M
ar 
20
19
21.2 Solutions and Contributions
We study the economic interactions between two com-
petitive MNOs and a group of heterogeneous mobile users.
We use a three-stage game model to characterize the MNOs’
rollover mechanism adoption and pricing decisions, as well
as users’ subscriptions. To be more specific, the two MNOs
simultaneously decide their data mechanisms (traditional or
rollover) in Stage I, and the corresponding pricing strategies
(including subscription fee and the per-unit fee) for the same
data caps in Stage II. Finally, users make their subscription
decisions to maximize their payoffs in Stage III.
The main results and key contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• Duopoly Competition for Mobile Data Plans with Time Flex-
ibility: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
paper that systematically studies the MNOs’ duopoly
competition considering their rollover data mechanism
offering and pricing decisions.
• A Three-Stage Competition Model: We formulate the
MNOs’ market competition and users’ subscription as
a three-stage game. Despite the complexity of the game,
we characterize the equilibrium considering MNOs’ het-
erogeneity in the Quality-of-Service (QoS) and the oper-
ational cost, as well as users’ heterogeneity in their data
valuations.
• Data Mechanism Equilibrium: Our analysis shows that the
high-QoS MNO would gradually abandon the rollover
mechanism as its QoS advantage diminishes (due to
its increasing cost or the competitor’s decreasing cost).
In this progress, however, the low-QoS MNO has the
opportunity to upgrade to the rollover mechanism. Par-
ticularly, the market competition shares some similarity
with that of the anti-coordination game when the MNOs
have similar QoS and experience comparable cost. That
is, no matter who adopts the rollover mechanism, the
other will choose to adopt the traditional one.
• Evaluation based on Empirical Data: The numerical results
based on the empirical data show that the market compe-
tition significantly reduces MNO’s profits. Furthermore,
both MNOs can obtain higher profits when they have
the choice of adopting the rollover mechanism in the
duopoly market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we review the related works. Section 3 introduces
the system model. Section 4 studies users’ subscriptions.
Section 5 investigates MNOs’ pricing competition. Section
6 analyzes MNOs’ data mechanism adoptions. Section 7
provides numerical results. Finally, we conclude this paper
in Section 8.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
There have been many excellent studies on mobile data
pricing (e.g., [10], [11], [12], [13]). However, these prior
studies did not take into account the recently introduced
rollover mechanism or the ubiquitous market competition
in practice.
The rollover data mechanism has been recently studied
(e.g., [8], [9], [14], [15], [16]). Zheng et al. in [14] examined
such an innovative data mechanism and found that mod-
erately price-sensitive users can benefit from subscribing
TABLE 1: Comparing Mobile Data Pricing Literatures.
Literature Rollover Mechanism Market Competition
[12]-[15] × ×
[8][9][14]-[16] X ×
[17]-[20] × X
This Paper X X
to the rollover data plan. Wei et al. in [15] analyzed the
impact of different rollover period lengths from the MNO’s
perspective. In our previous work [8], [9], we proposed a
unified framework for different rollover mechanisms and
studied the corresponding optimal design under the single-
cap and multi-cap schemes. Moreover, we examined the
economic viability of the rollover mechanism and the data
trading market [16]. However, all of these studies only
considered the monopoly case and neglected the ubiquitous
market competition in practice.
There are many studies related to multiple MNOs’ mar-
ket competitions in terms of their pricing decisions (e.g.,
[17], [18], [19], [20]). For example, Gibbens et al. in [17]
focused on the Paris Metro pricing scheme and analyzed the
competition between two ISPs who offer multiple service
classes. Later on Chau et al. in [18] further considered a more
general competition model and derived the necessary con-
ditions for the equilibrium. Ma et al. in [19] focused on the
usage-based scheme and considered the congestion-prone
scenario with multiple MNOs. Ren et al. in [20] focused
on users’ aggregate data demand dynamics, and optimized
the MNO’s data plans and long-term network capacity
decisions. However, none of these studies considered the
MNOs’ different rollover data mechanisms offering.
In this paper, we study MNOs’ market competition in
terms of the rollover mechanism adoption and the pricing
decisions.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
We study the market competition between two MNOs
who face a common pool of mobile users. We formulate the
system interactions as a three-stage game and characterize
how the MNOs’ heterogeneity in the Quality-of-Service
(QoS) and the operational cost, as well as users’ heterogene-
ity in the data valuations, affect the various decisions.
Each MNO-n (n = 1, 2) offers a mobile data plan
specified by a tuple Tn = {Qn,Πn, pin, κn}: a subscriber
of MNO-n needs to pay a monthly subscription fee Πn for
the data cap Qn, and possibly some usage-based overage
fee pin for each unit of data consumption exceeding the
data cap Qn. Here κn ∈ {T, R} denotes the data mechanism
that the MNO-n adopts. Specifically, κn = T represents the
traditional mechanism, while κn = R represents the rollover
mechanism.
For κn = R, the rollover data “inherited” from the
previous month is consumed prior to the current monthly
data cap and expires at the end of the current month.1
Basically, the rollover data enlarges a subscriber’s effective
data cap within which no overage fee involved. Based on
1. In practice, there are two different consumption priorities, which
has been studied in our previous work. We refer interested readers to
[8], [21] for more details.
3Stage II
Each MNO- announces the subscription fee and per-unit 
fee and .
Stage III
Each type- user makes his subscription choice to 
maximzie his payoff.
Stage I
Each MNO- determines its data mechanism and .
Fig. 1: Three-stage competition model.
our previous study of the monopoly market in [8], [21], here
we denote τ as a user’s rollover data at the beginning of a
month, and Qeκn(τ) as the effective cap of the current month
under MNO-n’s data plan Tn = {Qn,Πn, pin, κn}.
• The case of κn = T denotes the traditional data mecha-
nism without rollover data, i.e., τ = 0. The effective cap
of each month is QeT(τ) = Qn;
• The case of κn = R denotes the rollover data mechanism.
The rollover data τ ∈ [0, Qn] from the previous month
enlarges the effective cap of the current month, i.e.,
QeR(τ) = Qn + τ .
We study the two MNOs’ market competition in terms
of their rollover mechanism adoption and pricing decisions,
given the same data caps (e.g., Q1 = Q2 = 1GB).2 As
illustrated in Fig. 1, in Stage I, two MNOs simultaneously
announce their data mechanisms κ1 and κ2. In Stage II, two
MNOs simultaneously determine the corresponding prices
s1 = {Π1, pi1} and s2 = {Π2, pi2}.3 Finally, users will make
their subscription choices in Stage III.
Next we introduce users’ payoffs and the MNOs’ profits
in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, respectively. Table 2 summa-
rizes some key notations in this paper.
3.1 Users’ Payoffs
3.1.1 User Characteristics
Now we introduce three characterizations of a user: the
data demand d, the data valuation θ, and the network
substitutability β. Based on these, we will derive a user’s
monthly expected payoff.
First, we model a user’s data demand d as a discrete
random variable with a probability mass function f(d), a
mean value of d¯, and a finite integer support {0, 1, 2, ..., D}
[20]. Here the data demand is measured in the minimum
data unit (e.g., 1KB or 1MB according to the MNOs).
Second, we denote θ as a user’s utility from consuming
one unit of data, i.e., the user’s data valuation as in [19], [23].
2. In practice, MNOs usually offer multiple data caps, e.g., 1GB, 2GB,
or 3GB. We have studied the multi-cap optimization problem for a
monopoly MNO in [9]. Here we assume that the two MNOs have the
same data cap, and focus on the impact of the pricing and the choice of
data mechanism.
3. The competition model is motivated by practical observations: an
MNO usually fixes a data mechanism over a relatively long time (e.g.,
three or five years), and updates the price choices more frequently
(e.g., on a yearly basis). This formulation captures the MNO’s different
decisions at different time scales. Moreover, to reveal the impact of the
rollover mechanism on MNOs’ market competition, we assume that
MNOs make simultaneous decisions in each stage. We will consider
the sequential decision process (as in [22]) in our future work.
TABLE 2: Key Notations.
Symbols Physical Meaning
MNO
Qn The data cap of MNO-n.
Πn The subscription fee of MNO-n.
pin The overage usage fee of MNO-n.
κn The data mechanism of MNO-n.
sn The pricing decision (sn = {Πn, pin}) of MNO-n.
ρn The quality of service (QoS) of MNO-n.
cn The marginal operational cost of MNO-n.
ψn The cost-quality ratio of MNO-n, i.e., ψn = cn/ρn.
σn The threshold user type of MNO-n.
Wn The expected profit of MNO-n.
σ˜ The neutral user type of the two MNOs.
User
θ A user’s valuation for consuming one unit data.
β Users’ common network substitutability.
Vκn The expected usage of an MNO-n’s subscriber.
U¯n The expected payoff of an MNO-n’s subscriber.
According to the empirical results from [8], in the telecom
market of mainland China, the users’ data valuations follow
a gamma distribution, and falls into the range between 10
RMB/GB and 60 RMB/GB with a large probability.
Third, we consider a user’s behavior change after he
exceeds the effective cap. Although the user will still continue
consuming data, he will reduce his consumption by relying
more heavily on alternative networks (such as office or
home Wi-Fi networks). Following [24], we characterize such
a behavior by a user’s network substitutability β ∈ [0, 1],
which denotes the fraction of overage usage shrink. For
example, β = 0.6 means that on average, 60% of the user’s
portion of data demand above the effective cap will be
reduced. A larger β corresponds to more overage usage
reduction (hence, a better network substitutability). The
empirical results in [8] show that most people would shrink
85% ∼ 95% overage usage. That is, users do not differ
significantly in terms of their network substitutability.
In the following, we normalize the total population size
to be one and follow [25], [26] by exploring users’ hetero-
geneity in the data valuation θ. Hence we characterize each
user according to his type θ. The distribution of θ of the
entire user population has a PDF h(θ) and CDF H(θ) with
the support [0, θmax].
3.1.2 User Payoff under Different Data Mechanisms
Next we introduce users’ payoffs based on their charac-
teristics and the effect of different data mechanisms.
A user’s payoff is the difference between his utility
and the total payment. More specifically, for an MNO-
n’s subscriber with d units of data demand and an ef-
fective data cap Qeκn(τ), his actual data consumption is
d − β[d − Qeκn(τ)]+, where [x]+ = max{0, x}. Moreover,
we use ρn to represent the MNO-n’s average quality of
service (QoS).4 Mathematically, the parameter ρn is a utility
multiplicative coefficient, thus the subscriber’s utility is
ρnθ(d− β[d−Qeκn(τ)]+). In addition, the subscriber’s total
payment consists of the subscription fee Πn and the overage
4. An MNO’s wireless data service depends on the network con-
gestion, which has been studied before (e.g., [5], [19]). In this work,
instead of modeling the detailed congestion-aware control, we are more
interested in the long-term average quality of the MNO’s wireless data
service. Hence the parameter ρ represents the impact of the MNO’s
average QoS on users’ utilities of consuming data.
4charge pin(1− β)[d−Qeκn(τ)]+. Therefore, a type-θ MNO-n
subscriber’s payoff with a data demand d and an effective cap
Qeκn(τ) is
Un(Tn, θ, d, τ) = ρnθ
(
d− β[d−Qeκn(τ)]+
)
− pin(1− β)[d−Qeκn(τ)]+ −Πn.
(1)
For κn = R, the data demand d and the rollover data τ
in (1) are two random variables that change in each month.
However, for κn = T, the rollover data τ in (1) is always
zero, the randomness only lies in the monthly data demand
d. Therefore, we take the expectation over d (and τ ) to get a
type-θ user’s expected monthly payoff under Tn as follows:
U¯n(Tn, θ) =Ed,τ
{
Un (Tn, θ, d, τ)
}
=ρnθ
[
d¯− βAκn(Qn)
]
− pin(1− β)Aκn(Qn)−Πn.
(2)
Here Aκn(Qn) is the user’s expected monthly overage data
consumption under Tn, which is given by
Aκn(Qn) =

∑
d
[d−Qen(τ)]+ f(d), if κn = T,∑
τ
∑
d
[d−Qen(τ)]+ f(d)pR(τ), if κn = R.
(3)
Note that in (2), the difference between the traditional
and rollover mechanisms is entirely captured by Aκn(·).
Specifically, pR(·) represents the distribution of the sub-
scriber’s rollover data. In our previous work [8], [21], we
have introduced how to compute pR(·) in detail, and ob-
tained the following inequality
AT(Q) > AR(Q), ∀ Q ∈ (0, D), (4)
which indicates that a user incurs less overage data con-
sumption under the rollover mechanism R. This is why
we say that the rollover mechanism R offers a better time
flexibility than the traditional mechanism T. In this paper,
we will directly use this conclusion, and refer interested
readers to Section 4 in [8] for more details.
Later on, we will study two MNOs’ competition given
their same data caps. To facilitate our later analysis, here we
further define Vκn as
Vκn , d¯− βAκn(Qn), (5)
which represents the user’s expected monthly data consump-
tion under the data mechanism κn. According to (4), we
know that the rollover mechanism R encourages users to
consume more data, i.e.,
VR > VT. (6)
The inequality (6) plays a significant roles when we
analyze MNOs’ competition over their data mechanisms,
we will further discuss it in Section 6.
Substituting (5) into (2), we can write a type-θ Tn sub-
scriber’s expected monthly payoff as
U¯n(Tn, θ) = ρnVκnθ − pin
(
β−1 − 1) (d¯− Vκn)−Πn, (7)
where ρnVκn represents the user’s utility increment for unit
data valuation increment under the subscription of MNO-
n. In the following analysis, we will directly use (7). To
emphasize its dependence on the data mechanism κn and
the pricing strategy sn = {Πn, pin}, sometimes we will write
U¯n(Tn, θ) as U¯n(κn, sn, θ).
3.2 MNOs’ Profits in Competition
Next we focus on two MNOs’ market competition and
derive their profits given their data mechanism adoption
κ = {κ1, κ2} and the pricing strategies s = {s1, s2}.
3.2.1 MNO Revenue
The MNO’s revenue from a single subscriber includes
the subscription fee and the overage payment. Therefore,
the expected monthly revenue of MNO-n from a type-θ subscriber
is
R¯n(κn, sn, θ) = pin
(
β−1 − 1) (d¯− Vκn)+ Πn, (8)
where pin(β−1 − 1)(d¯ − Vκn) is the subscriber’s expected
monthly overage payment. Therefore, the expected monthly
revenue of MNO-n from all its subscribers is
Rn(κ, s) =
∫
Φn(κ,s)
R¯n(κn, sn, θ)h(θ)dθ. (9)
where Φn(κ, s) ⊆ [0, θmax] denotes the subscribers of MNO-
n under data mechanism κ and pricing strategy s. We will
further discuss the calculation over the user type θ in Section
4.
3.2.2 MNO Cost
As for the MNO’s cost, we focus on its operational
expenditure (OpEx). Specifically, it is proportional to the
total data consumption of the MNO’s subscribers [27]. The
total expected data consumption of MNO-n’s subscribers is
Ln(κ, s) =
∫
Φn(κ,s)
Vκnh(θ)dθ, (10)
where Vκn defined in (5) represents a user’s expected
monthly data consumption under Tn. For analysis tractabil-
ity, we follow [27] by considering a linear cost, and denote
cn as MNO-n’s marginal cost from unit data consumption.5
Accordingly, the total cost of MNO-n is
Cn(κ, s) = Ln(κ, s) · cn. (11)
3.2.3 MNO Profit
The MNO-n’s profit Wn(κ, s) is defined as the difference
between its revenue and cost, i.e.,
Wn(κ, s) = Rn(κ, s)− Cn(κ, s). (12)
Now we have formulated MNOs’ profits in the duopoly
market, and introduced MNOs’ two orthogonal characteris-
tics: the QoS parameter ρn as in (7) and the marginal cost
parameter as cn in (11). Next we use backward induction to
study the three-stage game.
4 USER SUBSCRIPTION IN STAGE III
In Stage III, each user makes his subscription decision
given the two MNOs’ pricing strategies s = {s1, s2} in
Stage II and data mechanism κ = {κ1, κ2} in Stage I.
Specifically, a type-θ user will subscribe to MNO-n if MNO-
n can bring him a larger (among the two MNOs) and non-
negative payoff. For notation simplicity, we first introduce
two definitions in Section 4.1, then we present the duopoly
market partition in Section 4.2.
5. Such a linear-form cost has been widely used to model the opera-
tor’s operational cost (e.g., [25], [28]).
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Fig. 2: Partition structure.
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(b) MNO-1 surviving (Σ2)
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(c) Share the market (Σ3).
Fig. 3: Three market partition modes in the duopoly market.
4.1 Threshold User Type and Neutral User Type
4.1.1 Threshold User Type
We introduce the threshold user type σn of MNO-n in
Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Threshold User Type). The MNO-n’s threshold
user type σn ∈ [0, θmax] corresponds to the user who achieves a
zero expected payoff, i.e., U¯n(κn, sn, σn) = 0.6 Thus, σn is
σn(κn, sn) ,
pin(β
−1 − 1)(d¯− Vκn) + Πn
ρnVκn
. (13)
Note from (13) that the MNO-n’s threshold user type
σn(κn, sn) depends on its data mechanism κn and the
pricing strategy sn = {Πn, pin}. Moreover, ρnVκn in (13)
represents the user’s utility increment for unit data val-
uation increment under the subscription of MNO-n. For
notation simplicity, we define ξ(κ) as in (14), which will
be used in Section 4.1.2 for the definition of the neutral user
type.
ξ(κ) , ρ2Vκ2
ρ1Vκ1
. (14)
Note that ξ(κ) depends on the MNOs’ data mechanisms
κ = {κ1, κ2}. Since we will analyze users’ subscription
(in Section 4) and MNOs’ pricing competition (in Section
5) given data mechanism selection κ from Stage I, without
loss of generality, we make Assumption 1 in Section 4 and
Section 5. That is, under the data mechanism selection κ in
Stage I, MNO-1 has an advantage in terms of ρnVκn among
the two MNOs, i.e., its subscribers’ marginal utility change
for one unit data valuation increment is larger. Hence we
say MNO-1 is “stronger”.
Assumption 1. Given the data mechanism κ, ξ(κ) < 1.
Note that Assumption 1 is not a technical assumption that
limits our contributions for two reasons. First, we can use
a similar approach to analyze the case of ξ(κ) > 1 (by
switching the indices of the two MNOs). Second, the case
of ξ(κ) = 1 corresponds to the well-known Bertrand com-
petition [29], which is actually a degeneration of the case
ξ(κ) < 1 and ξ(κ) > 1. We refer interested readers to
Appendix C for more detailed discussions.
4.1.2 Neutral User Type
We introduce the neutral user type σ˜ between the two
MNOs in Definition 2.
6. Among the user group defined by θ ∈ [0, θmax], all users experience
a negative payoff if σn(κn, sn) > θmax.
Definition 2 (Neutral User Type). The neutral user type,
denoted by σ˜, is a user type who can achieve the same payoff by
subscribing to either MNO, i.e., U¯1(κ1, s1, σ˜) = U¯2(κ2, s2, σ˜).
We can derive σ˜ as follows
σ˜(σ1, σ2) =
σ1 − ξ(κ) · σ2
1− ξ(κ) , (15)
where σ1 and σ2 are two MNOs’ threshold user types defined in
Definition 1.
So far we have introduced the threshold user type and
the neutral user type. Next let us move on to the subscrip-
tion equilibrium in the duopoly market.
4.2 Duopoly Market Partition
Based on Definitions 1 and 2, we summarize the market
partition in Theorem 1. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 1 (Market Partition Equilibrium). Consider MNOs’
threshold user types σ1 and σ2 under the data mechanism
κ = {κ1, κ2} and the pricing strategy s = {s1, s2}. The market
partition equilibrium, denoted by Φ∗1(κ, s) and Φ
∗
2(κ, s), has
three cases in the (σ1, σ2) plane shown in Fig. 2.
1) Σ1: MNO-1 has a much larger threshold user type than
MNO-2, i.e., (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 where Σ1 is
Σ1 , {(σ1, σ2) : σ1− σ2 ≥ (1− ξ(κ))(θmax− σ2)}. (16)
In this case, MNO-2’s market share corresponds to the users
with θ in Φ∗2(κ, s) = [σ2, θmax], while MNO-1 has a zero
market share Φ∗1(κ, s) = ∅, as shown in Fig. 3(a).
2) Σ2: MNO-1 has a smaller threshold user type than MNO-2,
i.e., (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ2 where Σ2 is
Σ2 , {(σ1, σ2) : σ1 − σ2 ≤ 0}. (17)
In this case, MNO-1 has a market share of Φ∗1(κ, s) =
[σ1, θmax], while MNO-2 has a zero market share of
Φ∗2(κ, s) = ∅, as shown in Fig. 3(b).
3) Σ3: MNO-1 has a slightly larger threshold user type than
MNO-2, i.e., (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ3 where Σ3 is
Σ3 , {(σ1, σ2) : 0 < σ1 − σ2 < (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2)}.
(18)
In this case, MNO-1 has a market share of Φ∗1(κ, s) =
[σ˜, θmax], and MNO-2 has a market share of Φ∗2(κ, s) =
[σ2, σ˜], as shown in Fig. 3(c).
Theorem 1 reveals two market partition equilibriums,
i.e., coexistence (i.e., Σ3) or one-MNO-surviving (i.e., Σ1,
and Σ2), depending on the data mechanism κ and the
6pricing strategy s. Note that the one-MNO-surviving result
is different from the monopoly case, since the zero market
share MNO in the one-MNO-surviving case might still affect
the decisions of the surviving MNO. We will further discuss
it in Section 5.1.
5 MNOS’ PRICING COMPETITION IN STAGE II
In Stage II, the MNOs simultaneously determine the
pricing strategies s={s1, s2}, given their data mechanisms
κ={κ1, κ2} in Stage I and the market partition equilibrium
in Stage III.
We substitute the subscription equilibrium Φ∗1(κ, s) and
Φ∗2(κ, s) from Theorem 1 into (12) and derive the two
MNOs’ profits as follows:
W1(κ,σ) = ρ1Vκ1
[
σ1 − c1ρ1
] [
1−H(σ˜(σ1, σ2))], (19)
W2(κ,σ) = ρ2Vκ2
[
σ2 − c2ρ2
] [
H
(
σ˜(σ1, σ2)
)−H(σ2)], (20)
where σ1, σ2, and σ˜ depend on the pricing strategies s and
data mechanisms κ.
According to (19) and (20), we note that the MNOs’ prof-
its at the equilibrium of Stage III are uniquely determined
by the data mechanism κ = {κ1, κ2} and the threshold user
types σ = {σ1, σ2}. Moreover, (13) shows that MNO-n is
able to achieve an arbitrary threshold user type σn(κn, sn)
by adjusting the pricing strategies sn = {Πn, pin}. Hence
the MNOs’ price competition in Stage II is equivalent to the
following threshold competition game:
Game 1 (Threshold Competition in Stage II). Given the data
mechanism κ = {κ1, κ2}, the two MNOs’ threshold competition
in Stage II can be modeled as the following game:
• Players: MNO-n for both n = 1, 2.
• Strategies: Each MNO-n determines its threshold user type
σn ∈ [cn/ρn, θmax].
• Preferences: Each MNO-n obtains a profit Wn(κ,σ).
Next we will study the MNOs’ best responses of Game
1 in Section 5.1, then find the the equilibrium which corre-
sponds to the fixed point of the best responses in Section 5.2.
Before that, we introduce two notations as follows.
• σMPn (κn): Part of the best response analysis is related to
the MNO-n’s optimal threshold user type σMPn (κn) given
the data mechanism κn in the monopoly market, which is
studied in our previous work [8], [21]. In the following,
we will directly use σMPn (κn) and provide more details
in Appendix B.
• ψn: As we will see later, the MNO’s cost-QoS ratio cn/ρn
plays a significant role in the best response analysis. For
notation simplicity, we define ψn as follows:
ψn ,
cn
ρn
, ∀ n ∈ {1, 2}. (21)
5.1 Best Response Analysis
Since we have assumed that MNO-1 is stronger and
MNO-2 is weaker, the two MNOs’ best responses will be
different. We will investigate the best response of MNO-2
and MNO-1 in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, respectively.
5.1.1 Best Response of the Weaker MNO-2
To facilitate the analysis of the weaker MNO-2’s best
response to the stronger MNO-1’s threshold user choice, we
first introduce the MNO-1’s winning threshold θW1 , ψ2, no-
influence threshold θN1 , ξ(κ)σMP2 (κ2) + (1− ξ(κ))θmax, and
losing threshold θL1 that satisfies
θL1 −(1−ξ(κ))θmax
ξ(κ) −
1−H
(
θL1 −(1−ξ(κ))θmax
ξ(κ)
)
h
(
θL1 −(1−ξ(κ))θmax
ξ(κ)
) = ψ2, (22)
where θL1 is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the
increasing failure rate (IFR).7
Lemma 1 presents the the weaker MNO-2’s best re-
sponse. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 1 (Best Response of MNO-2). Given MNO-1’s thresh-
old user type σ1, MNO-2 maximizes its profit W2(κ,σ) by
choosing a threshold user type σ∗2(κ, σ1) as follows:
σ∗2(κ, σ1) =

ψ2, if σ1 ∈ [0, θW1 ),
σˆ2, if σ1 ∈ [θW1 , θL1 ),
σ1+(ξ(κ)−1)θmax
ξ(κ) , if σ1 ∈ [θL1 , θN1 ),
σMP2 (κ2), if σ1 ∈ [θN1 , θmax].
(23)
Here σˆ2 solves σˆ2 − H(σ˜(σ1,σˆ2))−H(σˆ2)ξ(κ)
1−ξ(κ)h(σ˜(σ1,σˆ2))+h(σˆ2)
= ψ2, where h(·)
and H(·) represent the PDF and CDF of users’ data valuation θ,
respectively.
Lemma 1 is applicable to an arbitrary θ distribution
satisfying the IFR. For the illustration purpose, Fig. 4 plots
the MNO-2’s best response under a uniform distribution of
θ, i.e., h(θ) = 1/θmax. Specifically, the red line segments (i.e.,
BR2-a, BR2-b, BR2-c, and BR2-d) denote σ∗2(κ, σ1). Next we
discuss the physical meanings of the four different parts of
best response in Lemma 1.
• BR2-a: MNO-2 gives up the competition and obtains a
zero market share, i.e., (σ1, σ∗2(κ, σ1)) ∈ Σ2, if MNO-1’s
threshold user type is smaller than its winning threshold,
i.e., σ1 < θW1 .
• BR2-b: MNO-2 shares the market with MNO-1, i.e.,
(σ1, σ
∗
2(κ, σ1)) ∈ Σ3, if MNO-1’s threshold user type
is between its winning and losing thresholds, i.e., θW1 ≤
σ1 < θ
L
1 .
• BR2-c: MNO-2 leaves MNO-1 a zero market share, i.e.,
(σ1, σ
∗
2(κ, σ1)) ∈ Σ1, if MNO-1’s threshold user type is
between its losing and no-influence thresholds, i.e., θL1 ≤
σ1 < θ
N
1 .
• BR2-d: MNO-2 becomes a monopoly in the market (de-
ciding its threshold user type without considering the
existence of MNO-1), i.e., σ∗2(κ, σ1) = σ
MP
2 (κ2), if MNO-
1’s threshold user type is no smaller than its no-influence
threshold, i.e., θN1 ≤ σ1 ≤ θmax.
5.1.2 Best Response of the Stronger MNO-1
Now we consider the stronger MNO-1’s best response to
the weaker MNO-2. Similarly, we first define MNO-2’s win-
7. The IFR condition means that h(θ)/[1 − H(θ)] increases in θ.
Many commonly used distributions (e.g., uniform distribution, normal
distribution, and gamma distribution) satisfy the IFR condition.
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Fig. 7: The illustration of Game 1 equilibriums for the five (ψ1, ψ2) regimes shown in Fig. 6.
ning threshold θW2 ,
ψ1+(ξ(κ)−1)θmax
ξ(κ) , no-influence threshold
θN2 , σMP1 (κ1), and losing threshold θL2 that satisfies
θL2 −
1−H(θL2 )
1
1−ξ(κ)h(θL2 )
= ψ1, (24)
where θL2 is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the
IFR.
Lemma 2 (Best Response of MNO-1). Given MNO-2’s thresh-
old user type σ2, MNO-1 maximizes its profit W1(κ,σ) by the
threshold user type σ∗1(κ, σ2), which satisfies
σ∗1(κ, σ2) =

ψ1, if σ2 ∈ [0, θW2 ),
σˆ1, if σ2 ∈ [θW2 , θL2 ),
σ2, if σ2 ∈ [θL2 , θN2 ),
σMP1 (κ1), if σ2 ∈ [θN2 , θmax],
(25)
where σˆ1 solves σˆ1 − 1−H(σ˜(σˆ1,σ2))1
1−ξ(κ)h(σ˜(σˆ1,σ2))
= ψ1.
Lemma 2 applies to an arbitrary θ distribution satisfying
the IFR. Fig. 5 illustrates the results in Lemma 2 under a
uniform distribution. For an easy comparison with Fig. 4, in
Fig. 5 we plot the best response σ∗1(κ, σ2) on the horizontal
axis and the variable σ2 on the vertical axis. Moreover, Fig.
5 contains two cases (sub-figures):
• Fig. 5(a): When MNO-1 has a relatively large cost-QoS
ratio, i.e., ψ1 > (1−ξ(κ))θmax, the corresponding insights
are similar to Fig. 4.
• Fig. 5(b): When MNO-1 has a small cost-QoS ratio, i.e.,
ψ1 ≤ (1 − ξ(κ))θmax, MNO-2’s winning threshold θW2 is
always negative. This means that no matter how small
the MNO-2’s threshold user type σ2 is, MNO-1 can
always get a positive market share, i.e., (σ∗1(κ, σ2), σ2) /∈
Σ1 for all σ2. This is possible as MNO-2 is the weaker
one. Fig. 5(a) represents a degenerated case of Fig. 5(b).
5.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Based on the above best responses, i.e., σ∗1(κ, σ2) and
σ∗2(κ, σ1) characterized in Lemmas 1 and 2, next we will
study the threshold equilibrium of Game 1, denoted by σ∗ =
{σ∗1 , σ∗2}.
Theorem 2 characterizes the different outcomes of Game
1 (based on the (ψ1, ψ2) plane) and the corresponding equi-
librium σ∗ = {σ∗1 , σ∗2} of each outcome. Moreover, Fig. 6
and Fig. 7 illustrate the general results of Theorem 2 assum-
ing a uniform distribution of θ. In Fig. 6, the horizontal and
vertical axises correspond to ψ1 and ψ2, respectively. The
five (ψ1, ψ2) regions correspond to the different outcomes of
Game 1. In Fig. 7, each sub-figure represents the two MNOs’
best responses under one of the five outcomes in Fig. 6.
Theorem 2. Game 1 has five different types of equilibrium based
on the values of (ψ1, ψ2), as illustrated Fig. 6.
1) MNO-1’s strong monopoly regime (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ ΨSM1 =
{(ψ1, ψ2) : ψ2 > θN2 (ψ1, ξ)}: MNO-2 obtains a zero market
share. The equilibrium σ∗(κ) is
σ∗(κ) =
{
σMP1 (κ1), ψ2
}
, (26)
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(a). MNO-2
gives up the competition, thus MNO-1 can decide its threshold
user type without considering the impact of MNO-2.
2) MNO-1’s weak monopoly regime (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ ΨWM1 =
{(ψ1, ψ2) : θL2 (ψ1, ξ) < ψ2 ≤ θN2 (ψ1, ξ)}: MNO-2 obtains
a zero market share. The equilibrium σ∗(κ) is
σ∗ =
{
ψ2, ψ2
}
, (27)
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(b). MNO-2
still tries to compete for market share, but in vain. However,
MNO-1 has to decide its threshold user type considering the
impact of MNO-2.
83) Coexistence regime (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ ΨC = {(ψ1, ψ2) : ψ2 ≤
θL2 (ψ1, ξ), ψ1 ≤ θL1 (ψ2, ξ)}. Both MNOs share the market.
The equilibrium σ∗(κ) solves
σ∗1 − 1−H(σ˜(σ
∗
1 ,σ
∗
2 ))
1
1−ξ(κ)h(σ˜(σ
∗
1 ,σ
∗
2 ))
= ψ1,
σ∗2 − H(σ˜(σ
∗
1 ,σ
∗
2 ))−H(σ∗2 )
ξ(κ)
1−ξ(κ)h(σ˜(σ
∗
1 ,σ
∗
2 ))+h(σ
∗
2 )
= ψ2,
(28)
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(c). Both
MNOs get strictly positive market share.
4) MNO-2’s weak monopoly regime (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ ΨWM2 =
{(ψ1, ψ2) : θL1 (ψ2, ξ) < ψ1 ≤ θN1 (ψ2, ξ)}. MNO-1 obtains
a zero market share. The equilibrium σ∗(κ) is
σ∗(κ) =
{
ψ1,
ψ1+(ξ(κ)−1)θmax
ξ(κ)
}
, (29)
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(d). MNO-1
still tries to compete for market share, but in vain. However,
MNO-2 has to decide its threshold user type considering the
impact of MNO-1.
5) MNO-2’s strong monopoly regime (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ ΨSM2 =
{(ψ1, ψ2) : ψ1 > θN1 (ψ2, ξ)}. MNO-2 obtains a zero market.
The equilibrium σ∗(κ) is
σ∗(κ) =
{
ψ1, σ
MP
2 (κ2)
}
. (30)
which is illustrated by the green circle in Fig. 7(e). MNO-1
gives up the competition, thus MNO-2 decides its threshold
user type without considering the impact of MNO-1.
Note that the threshold users type σn corresponds to dif-
ferent combinations of the subscription fee and the per-unit
fee (according to Definition 1). Therefore, the uniqueness of
the equilibrium in Game 1 does not necessarily imply the
unique pricing equilibrium in terms of the subscription fee
and the per-unit fee.
So far we have characterized the equilibrium σ∗(κ) in
Stage II under the data mechanism κ. Next we move on to
the MNOs’ data mechanism selection in Stage I.
6 MNOS’ DATA MECHANISM SELECTION IN
STAGE I
In Stage I, the two MNOs will decide their data mecha-
nisms κ = {κ1, κ2}, considering the responses from Stages
II and III. Notice that we no longer needs Assumption 1,
which is only used to facilitate the analysis in Stages II
and III (without loss of generality). Moreover, we make
Assumption 2 in this section.
Assumption 2. MNO-1’s average QoS is no worse than that of
MNO-2, i.e., ρ1 ≥ ρ2.
Therefore, we will refer to MNO-1 and MNO-2 as the
high-QoS MNO and the low-QoS MNO, respectively. Note
that Assumption 2 is not a technical assumption that limits our
contributions, since we can always switch the indices of the
two MNOs if ρ1 < ρ2.
Note that the two MNOs’ costs (c1 and c2) will also play
important roles in the equilibrium analysis. We will capture
how the QoS values and costs interact with each other in
Theorem 4 and Fig. 9 at the end of Section 6.
We model the two MNOs’ data mechanism selection as
the following game.
TABLE 3: MNOs’ profits in Game 2.
PPPPPPκ1
κ2 T R
T W1(T, T), W2(T, T) W1(T, R), W2(T, R)
R W1(R, T), W2(R, T) W1(R, R), W2(R, R)
Game 2 (Data Mechanism Selection in Stage I). The two
MNOs’ data mechanism selection in Stage I can be modeled as
the following game:
• Players: MNO-n for both n = 1, 2.
• Strategies: Each MNO-n decides its data mechanism κn from
{T, R}.
• Preferences: Each MNO-n obtains a profit Wn(κ).
In Game 2, each MNO-n decides its data mechanism κn
to maximize its own profitWn(κ), considering the threshold
equilibrium σ∗(κ) (derived in Theorem 2) in Stage II. To
analyze Game 2, we need to specify the two-by-two profit
matrix as shown in Table 3, where the strategy of each MNO
is the data mechanism κn ∈ {T, R}. Since it is a two-by-two
profit matrix, we can directly go through each of the four
possible outcomes to check whether it is an equilibrium.
Recall that our earlier work [8], [21] showed that a monopoly
MNO should always choose the rollover mechanism R to
maximize its profit. For the duopoly market considered here,
however, we will show that this is not always the case, i.e.,
κ = {R, R} is not always the equilibrium of Game 2.
Next we first introduce the potential market partitions
at Game 2 equilibrium in Section 6.1, then we present
the equilibrium κ∗ = {κ∗1, κ∗2} in Section 6.2 and Section
6.3. Finally, we graphically illustrate the equilibrium κ∗ in
Section 6.4.
6.1 Market Partition at Game 2 Equilibrium
We characterize the three possible market partitions at a
Game 2 equilibrium in Theorem 3, depending on the two
MNOs’ average QoS (i.e., ρ1 and ρ2) and costs (i.e., c1 and
c2). The proof is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 3. There exist two threshold costs CSingle1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2)
and CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), such that the market partitions at a Game
2 equilibrium has three possibilities.
1) MNO-1 Surviving: If MNO-1 experiences an extremely small
cost, i.e., c1 < C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2), then MNO-2 obtains zero
market share.
2) MNO-2 Surviving: If MNO-2 experiences an extremely small
cost, i.e., c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), then MNO-1 obtains zero
market share.
3) Coexistence: If the two MNOs’ costs are comparable, i.e., c1 ≥
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) and c2 ≥ CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), then the two
MNOs share the market.
Moreover, the two threshold costs are given by
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) , ρ1
[
c2
ρ2
−
(
1− ρ2VTρ1VR
)
· 1−H
(
c2
ρ2
)
h
(
c2
ρ2
) ] , (31)
C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1) , max
{
ρ2
[
c1
ρ1
−
(
1− ρ1VTρ2VR
)
· 1−H
(
c1
ρ1
)
h
(
c1
ρ1
) ] ,
c1 − (ρ1 − ρ2)θmax − ρ2 ·
1−H
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
)
h
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
) }.
(32)
9We illustrate Theorem 3 in Fig. 8 under a uniform
distribution of θ. Specifically, the horizontal and vertical
axis corresponds to MNO-2’s cost c2 and MNO-1’s cost
c1, respectively. The two shaded (i.e., red and blue) areas
represent that only one MNO obtains a positive market
share. The white area represents that the two MNOs share
the market. In Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, we will present the
detailed equilibrium κ∗ for each area in Fig. 8. Before that,
let us introduce Na in Definition 3 for notation simplicity.
Definition 3. The notation Na is used to describe the equilibri-
ums in the following cases:
• The equilibrium κ∗ = (κ∗1, Na) represents that both (κ
∗
1, T)
and (κ∗1, R) are the equilibriums of Game 2.
• The equilibrium κ∗ = (Na, κ∗2) represents that both (T, κ
∗
2)
and (R, κ∗2) are the equilibriums of Game 2.
6.2 Single-MNO-Surviving
We introduce the data mechanism equilibrium κ∗ of the
single-MNO-surviving case in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. The
proofs are given in Appendix E.
Lemma 3. If c1 < C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2), then the high-QoS MNO-
1 obtains a positive market share, the low-QoS MNO-2 obtains
a zero market share independent of his choice and the data
mechanism equilibrium is
κ∗ = (R, Na). (33)
Furthermore, we have
W1(R, T) = W1(R, R). (34)
Lemma 4. If c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), then the low-QoS MNO-
2 obtains a positive market share, the high-QoS MNO-1 obtains
a zero market share independent of his choice and the data
mechanism equilibrium is
κ∗ = (Na, R). (35)
Furthermore, we have
W2(R, R) ≤W2(T, R). (36)
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 reveal the impact of MNO-1’s
QoS advantage (i.e., ρ1 ≥ ρ2):
• When the low-QoS MNO-2 obtains a zero market share
(i.e., c1 < C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2)) as in Lemma 3, its choice
between T and R has no effect on the high-QoS MNO-1,
i.e., W1(R, T) = W1(R, R).
• When the high-QoS MNO-1 obtains a zero market share
(i.e., c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1)) as in Lemma 4, it can reduce
the low-QoS MNO-2’s profit by choosing the rollover
mechanism R, i.e., W2(R, R) ≤W2(T, R).
6.3 Coexistence
Now we consider the case where both the MNOs ob-
tain positive market shares at Game 2 equilibrium, i.e.,
c1 ≥ CSingle1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) and c2 ≥ CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1).
To facilitate our later discussion, we first introduce the
QoS-Flip phenomenon in Section 6.3.1.
6.3.1 QoS-Flip Phenomenon
A counter-intuitive result that we will elaborate is that
the high-QoS MNO-1 will not always attract the high valua-
tion users. According to Theorem 1, MNO-1 attracts the high
valuation users if ρ1Vκ1 > ρ2Vκ2 , otherwise, MNO-2 attracts
the high valuation users if ρ1Vκ1 < ρ2Vκ2 . Recall that Vκn
defined in (5) depends on the data mechanism κn ∈ {T, R}.
The inequality (6) indicates
• The low-QoS MNO-2 can attract the high valuation users
under the data mechanism κ = {T, R} if ρ2 > ρ1VT/VR.
• The high-QoS MNO-1 can attract the high val-
uation users under the data mechanism κ ∈
{(T, T), (R, T), (R, R)}.
Therefore, the rollover mechanism may reverse the
MNO-2’s QoS disadvantage. We refer to this phenomenon
as QoS-flip, defined as follows:
Definition 4 (QoS-flip). The QoS-flip happens if the low-QoS
MNO-2 attracts the high valuation users, i.e., ρ2 > ρ1VT/VR,
under the data mechanism κ = {T, R}.
In the following analysis for the equilibrium of the
coexistence case, we will explain when QoS-flip happens.
6.3.2 Equilibrium of Coexistence Case
To present the equilibrium in the coexistence case clearly,
we need to use two cost thresholds (i.e., CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2)
and CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1)) and two QoS thresholds (i.e., ρ˜ and ρˆ),
which depend on both MNOs’ QoS (i.e., ρ1 and ρ2) and
costs (i.e., c1 and c2). Due to the complexity of the MNOs’
two-dimensional heterogeneity in QoS ρn and cost cn, as
well as the users’ heterogeneity in the data valuation θ,
there is no closed-form expression for CRoll1 , C
Roll
2 , ρ˜, and
ρˆ. Nevertheless, we will explain how to compute them
numerically in Appendix F.
Theorem 4 presents the data mechanism equilibrium of
the coexistence case.
Theorem 4. Under the coexistence case of Game 2, there exist
two QoS thresholds ρ˜ > ρˆ such that the equilibrium κ∗ has three
different possibilities:
1) When MNO-1 has a large QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e.,
0 < ρ2 ≤ ρˆ, the equilibrium κ∗ (as shown in Fig. 9(a)) is
• (R, T) if MNO-2 experiences a large cost, i.e., c2 >
CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1);
• (R, R) if MNO-2 experiences a small cost, i.e., c2 ≤
CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1).
2) When MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage over MNO-2, i.e.,
ρˆ < ρ2 ≤ ρ˜, then the equilibrium κ∗ (as shown in Fig. 9(b))
is
• (R, T) if MNO-2 experiences a large cost, i.e., c2 >
CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1);
• (R, R) if both MNO-1 and MNO-2 experience small and
comparable costs, i.e., c1 ≤ CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) and c2 ≤
CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1);
• (T, R) if MNO-1 experiences a large cost, i.e., c1 >
CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2).
3) When MNO-1 has a negligible QoS advantage over MNO-2,
i.e., ρ˜ < ρ2 ≤ ρ1, then the equilibrium κ∗ (as shown in Fig.
9(c)) is
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Fig. 9: Illustration of Theorem 4.
• (R, T) if MNO-1 experiences a small cost, i.e., c1 <
CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2);
• {(R, T), (T, R)} if both MNO-1 and MNO-2 experience
large and comparable costs, i.e., c1 ≥ CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2)
and c2 ≥ CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1);
• (T, R) if MNO-2 experiences a small cost, i.e., c2 <
CRoll2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1).
So far we have completely characterized the data mech-
anism equilibrium κ∗ of Game 2 in Theorems 3 and 4. Next
we will use the uniformly distributed market to illustrate
the equilibrium κ∗.
6.4 Equilibrium Illustration
Fig. 9 visualizes the equilibrium κ∗ under a uniform
distribution of θ. Specifically, the three sub-figures in Fig. 9
corresponds to different levels of MNO-1’s QoS advantage,
i.e., large for Fig. 9(a), small for Fig. 9(b), and negligible
for Fig. 9(c). In each sub-figure, the horizontal and vertical
axises correspond to MNO-2’s cost c2 and MNO-1’s cost c1,
respectively. We label the corresponding equilibrium κ∗ on
the (c2, c1) plane in each sub-figure.
MNO-1 Surviving: In each sub-figure of Fig. 9, the blue
region marked by (R, Na) represents that MNO-1 becomes a
monopoly in the market and leaves MNO-2 a zero market
share no matter which data mechanism MNO-2 adopts. This
is because that MNO-1 has enough cost advantage, i.e., c1 <
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2). In this case, there are two equilibriums,
i.e., (R, T) and (R, R).
MNO-2 Surviving: In each sub-figure of Fig. 9, the
red region marked by (Na, R) represents that MNO-2 be-
comes a monopoly in the market and leaves MNO-1 zero
market share no matter which data mechanism MNO-
1 adopts, since MNO-2 has a large cost advantage, i.e.,
c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1). Similarly, there are two equilibriums,
i.e., (T, R) and (R, R).
Coexistence: When two MNOs’ costs are comparable,
i.e., c1 ≥ CSingle1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) and c2 ≥ CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), they
will share the market. In this case, the equilibrium structure
also depends on their QoS difference:
• Fig. 9(a): MNO-1 has a large QoS advantage over MNO-
2, i.e., 0 < ρ2 ≤ ρˆ. According to the arrow in Fig. 9(a),
the equilibrium of Game 2 gradually changes from (R, T)
to (R, R) as MNO-1’s cost c1 increases or MNO-2’s cost
c2 decreases. That is, the large QoS advantage enables
MNO-1 to adopt rollover mechanism R all the time, but
the low-QoS MNO-2 has the opportunity of upgrading
to the rollover mechanism R as its cost advantage in-
creases which compensates its QoS disadvantage.
• Fig. 9(b): MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage over MNO-
2, i.e., ρˆ < ρ2 ≤ ρ˜. Based on the arrows in Fig. 9(b), as
MNO-1’s cost c1 increases or MNO-2’s cost c2 decreases,
the corresponding equilibrium changes according to the
order: (R, T)→ (R, R)→ (T, R). Different from the case of
Fig. 9(a), in Fig. 9(b) the QoS-flip phenomenon happens
at the equilibrium (T, R), since MNO-1’s QoS advantage
is not large enough and experiences a large cost.
• Fig. 9(c): MNO-1 has a negligible QoS advantage over
MNO-2, i.e., ρ˜ < ρ2 ≤ ρ1. As MNO-1’s cost c1 increases
or MNO-2’s cost c2 decreases, i.e., the arrows in Fig. 9(c),
the corresponding equilibrium changes according to the
order: (R, T) → {(R, T), (T, R)} → (T, R). We note that
the symmetric equilibriums {(R, T), (T, R)} arise between
(R, T) and (T, R), instead of the (R, R) in Fig. 9(b). This
is because that the negligible QoS advantage makes
the two MNOs more homogeneous and the head-to-
head market competition will reduce the profits of both
MNOs. Similar to the anti-coordination game (e.g., the
hawk-dove game), no matter who adopts the rollover
mechanism R, it is a best choice for the competitor to
choose the traditional mechanism T.
So far, we have finished the analysis for the three-stage
competition model, and revealed that κ = {R, R} is not
always the equilibrium in a competitive market, which is
consistent with our practical observations mentioned in
Section 1.1.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
Next we will simulate the MNOs’ data mechanism equi-
libriums based on empirical data in Section 7.1 and evaluate
the effects of rollover mechanism and market competition in
Section 7.2. Before that, let us first introduce our simulation
setting for mobile users and MNOs.
For mobile users, we adopt the empirical results from
the previous literatures to model the monthly data demand,
data valuation, and network substitutability. Specifically, we
follow the data analysis results in [30] and assume that
users’ monthly data demand follows a truncated log-normal
distribution with mean d¯ = 103 on the interval [0, 104],
i.e., the mean value is d¯ = 1GB and the maximal usage
is D = 10GB. Moreover, we adopt the empirical study in [8]
by assuming that θ follows a Gamma distribution with the
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Fig. 10: Game 2 equilibrium when ρ2 = 0.91.
shape parameter k = 4.5 and the scale parameter r = 0.11,
and assuming β = 0.8.
For the MNOs, we assume that both MNOs offer a 1GB
data plan, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = 1GB, and MNO-1 provides a
better QoS than MNO-2. For simplicity, we normalize MNO-
1’s QoS, i.e., ρ1 = 1, and consider three cases where MNO-2
provides different QoS, i.e., ρ2 ∈ {0.91, 0.95, 0.99}. Mathe-
matically, ρ2 = 0.91 corresponds to the large QoS advantage
case (mentioned in Theorem 4). The choices of ρ2 = 0.95
and ρ2 = 0.99 correspond to the small QoS advantage case
and the negligible QoS advantage case, respectively. Due to
space limit, we will only show the results of ρ2 = 0.91 in
the main paper and refer interested readers to Appendix G
for the results of ρ2 = {0.95, 0.99}.
7.1 Data Mechanism Equilibrium
We illustrate the data mechanism equilibrium κ∗ in
Game 2 by varying MNO-1’s cost c1, given MNO-2’s cost
c2 = 40 RMB/GB.
In Fig. 10(a), we plot the data mechanism equilibrium
κ∗ versus MNO-1’s cost c1, and label κ∗ on the top of the
figure. Specifically, the blue circle lines represent MNO-1’s
data mechanism κ∗1, the red triangle lines represents MNO-
2’s data mechanism κ∗2. Moreover, we use two line styles
(i.e., solid and dash) when there are two equilibriums.
Fig. 10(b) shows the two MNOs’ profits under the
equilibrium κ∗. Specifically, the blue circle curves and red
triangle curves represent MNO-1’s profitW1(κ∗) and MNO-
2’s profitW2(κ∗), respectively. The solid (dash, respectively)
curves in Fig. 10(b) correspond to the equilibriums plotted
by the solid (dash, respectively) lines in Fig. 10(a). Overall,
as MNO-1’s cost c1 increases, its profit (i.e., the blue circle
curve) eventually decreases to zero, while MNO-2’s profit
(i.e., the red circle curves) will increase. Moreover, MNO-1
experiences a significant profit drop when the equilibrium
changes from (R, T) to (R, R) at c1 = 51 RMB/GB. In
addition, the following observations validate Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4:
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Fig. 11: Impact of rollover mechanism on duopoly market.
• When MNO-1 obtains zero market share (c1 > 53
RMB/GB), the two equilibriums (T, R) and (R, R) lead to
different profits for MNO-2, i.e., W2(R, R) ≤ W2(T, R),
which shows that the high-QoS MNO-1 may reduce
MNO-2’s profit by choosing the rollover mechanism R,
even though it obtains zero market share.
• When MNO-2 obtains zero market share (c1 < 23
RMB/GB), the blue solid curve and the blue dash curve
overlap, which means that the two equilibriums (R, T)
and (R, R) lead to the same profit for MNO-1, i.e.,
W1(R, T) = W1(R, R).
7.2 Impact of Rollover Mechanism and Competition
Now we evaluate the impact of the rollover mechanism
and the market competition on the MNOs’ profits.
Fig. 11(a) plots MNO-1’s profit versus its cost c1 in four
scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without mark-
ers correspond to MNO-1’s monopoly market under data
mechanism T and R. The blue circle curve represents MNO-
1’s profit in the duopoly market under the equilibrium κ∗
shown in Fig. 10(a). Essentially, the blue circle curve is the
same as that in Fig. 10(b). The blue cross curve corresponds
to MNO-1’s profit in the duopoly market under fixed data
mechanisms (T, T). In this case, the MNOs only compete on
price (but not on the data mechanism choice). By comparing
the black curves with the blue curves, we find that the
market competition significantly reduces MNO-1’s profit.
By comparing the two blue curves with markers, we find
that the rollover mechanism significantly increases MNO-
1’s profit 274% (on average) in the market competition.
Fig. 11(b) plots MNO-2’s profit versus the cost c1 in
similar scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without
markers correspond to MNO-2’s monopoly market. The two
red curves correspond to the cases in the duopoly market.
The red triangle curve is the same as that in Fig. 10(b).
The red cross curve corresponds to MNO-2’s profit in the
duopoly market under fixed data mechanism (T, T). By
comparing the black curves with the red curves, we find
that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-
2’s profit. The profit decrement of MNO-2 is larger than
that of MNO-1, since MNO-1 has the QoS advantage and
attracts high-valuation users. By comparing the two red
curves with markers, we find that the rollover mechanism
increases MNO-1’s profit 188% (on average) in the market
competition.
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The above findings also hold for the small QoS advan-
tage and negligible QoS advantage cases. Please refer to
Appendix G for more details.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the duopoly competition in the
telecommunication market in terms of the MNOs’ rollover
mechanism adoption and the pricing decisions. Different
from the monopoly market, where the MNO always in-
crease its profit by adopting the rollover mechanism, the
data mechanism equilibrium in the duopoly market is much
more complicated. Roughly speaking, the high-QoS MNO
would gradually abandon the rollover mechanism as its
QoS advantage diminishes (due to its increasing cost or the
competitor’s decreasing cost).
In the future, we will extend the results of this paper
in the following aspects. First, we would like to collaborate
with MNOs and extend the current analysis by investigating
real world data. Second, we will consider a more realistic
oligopoly market and analyze the competition among mul-
tiple MNOs. We provide some preliminary results along
this direction in Appendix A. Third, we will study the
MNOs’ sequential data mechanism adoptions by following
the example in [22].
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APPENDIX A
OLIGOPOLY MARKET
In this section, we consider the competitive market
with N MNOs, denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each user
makes his subscription decision given the N MNOs’ pricing
strategies s = {sn,∀n ∈ N} and the data mechanisms
κ = {κn,∀n ∈ N}. Without loss of generality, we suppose
that ρ1Vκ1 > ρ2Vκ2 > ... > ρNVN . The type-θ user will
subscribe to MNO-n, denoted by θ ∈ Φn, if and only if
MNO-n brings him an non-negative and the largest payoff
among the N MNOs, i.e.,{
U¯n(Tn, θ) ≥ 0,
U¯n(Tn, θ) ≥ U¯m(Tm, θ),∀ m 6= n. (37)
To facilitate later discussion on the market partition
among the N MNOs, we follow (14) and define ξmn as
ξmn ,
ρmVκm
ρnVκn
, ∀ n,m ∈ N . (38)
We further express the neutral user type between MNO-n
and MNO-m, denoted by σ˜mn , as follows
σ˜mn (σn, σm) =
σn − ξmn · σm
1− ξmn
. (39)
The market partition for N competitive MNOs are much
more complicated compared with the duopoly case. Recall
that there three market partitions in the duopoly market
as discussed in Theorem 1. In the oligopoly case, however,
there are much more competition outcomes in terms of
which MNO would obtain a zero market share. Therefore,
we cannot enumerate all of the outcomes one by one. Never-
theless, we summarize the coexistence outcome in Theorem
5.
Theorem 5 (Coexistence of N MNOs). Consider the N
MNOs’ threshold user types σ = {σn,∀n ∈ N} under the
data mechanism selection κ = {κn,∀n ∈ N} and the pricing
strategy s = {sn,∀n ∈ N}. All of the MNOs obtain strictly
positive market share as following
Φ1 = [σ˜
2
1 , θmax],
Φn = [σ˜
n+1
n , σ˜
n
n−1],∀ n = 2, 3, ..., N − 1,
ΦN = [σN , σ˜
N
N−1],
(40)
if and only if the corresponding threshold user types σn (n ∈ N )
satisfies
0 ≤ σN < σN−1,
(1− ξn+1n−1)σn < (1− ξn+1n )σn−1 + (ξn+1n − ξn+1n−1)σn+1,
∀ n = 2, 3, ..., N − 1,
(1− ξ21)θmax + ξ21σ2 > σ1.
(41)
Fig. 12 illustrates the coexistence outcome discussed
in Theorem 5. Recall that ρnVκn represents a subscriber’s
marginal utility change for one unit data valuation incre-
ment. The MNO that provides a better QoS (i.e., ρn) and
better time flexibility (i.e., κn), can obtain the higher val-
uation subscribers and charge higher prices, hence obtains
more revenue.
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Fig. 12: The N MNOs coexist.
Under such a market partition, the corresponding profit
of each MNO is given by
Wn(κ,σ) =
ρ1Vκ1 [σ1 − ψ1]
[
1−H (σ˜21) ], n = 1,
ρnVκn [σn − ψn]
[
H
(
σ˜nn−1
)−H (σ˜n+1n ) ], 1 < n < N,
ρNVκN [σN − ψN ]
[
H
(
σ˜NN−1
)
−H (σN )
]
, n = N,
(42)
where σ˜n+1n depends on σn and σn+1, given by
σ˜n+1n =
σn − ξn+1n · σn+1
1− ξn+1n
. (43)
APPENDIX B
MONOPOLY MARKET AS BENCHMARK
In this section, we introduce the MNO’s optimal deci-
sions on the threshold user type and the data mechanism in
the monopoly market. The results in this section is partially
based on our previous results in [8], since we assume the
homogeneity in the network substitutability β.
Without loss of generality, let’s consider the monopoly
market of MNO-n under the data mechanism κn and the
pricing strategy sn = {Πn, pin}. According to Definition 1,
we denote σn(κn, sn) the threshold user type and the mar-
ket share of MNO-n is Φn = [σn(κn, sn), θmax]. Therefore,
the MNO-n’s expected profit under the data mechanism κn
and the pricing strategy sn is
Wn(κn, sn)
=ρnVκn
[
σn(κn, sn)− cn
ρn
] [
1−H(σn(κn, sn))], (44)
where H(·) is the CDF of users’ data valuation θ. Note that
MNO-n experiences a negative profit if its corresponding
threshold user type σn(κn, sn) < cn/ρn, which is a trivial
case. Moreover, MNO-n will have no subscriber if its cost-
QoS ratio cn/ρn is greater than the users’ highest data
valuation θmax. With this observation, we will focus on the
case where σn(κn, sn) ∈ [cn/ρn, θmax], where we assume
that cn/ρn < θmax to avoid the trivial case.
We characterize MNO-n’s profit-maximizing pricing
strategy sMPn and data mechanism κ
MP
n in Lemma 5 and
Lemma 6, respectively. Here the superscript “MP” means
“monopoly”.
Lemma 5. For monopoly MNO-n, given the data mechanism
κn, it maximizes its profit through a pricing strategy sMPn such
that its threshold user type σn(κn, sMPn ) = σ
MP
n (κn), which is
the solution to the following equation:
σMPn (κn)−
1−H(σMPn (κn))
h(σMPn (κn))
=
cn
ρn
, (45)
where σMPn (κn) is unique for an arbitrary θ distribution with the
increasing failure rate (IFR).
Proof of Lemma 5. We prove Lemma 5 by deriving the
MNO’s profit-maximizing threshold user type σMPn .
Recall that the MNO-n’s expected monthly profit under
the data mechanism κn and the pricing strategy sn is
Wn(κn, sn)
=ρnVκn
[
σn(κn, sn)− cn
ρn
] [
1−H(σn(κn, sn))
]
.
(46)
Given the data mechanism κn, the MNO’s expected
profit can be expressed as a function of the threshold user
type σn, as follows:
Wn(κn, σn) = ρnVκn
[
σn − cn
ρn
] [
1−H(σn)
]
. (47)
To compute the maximum value of (47), we take the deriva-
tive of (47) with respect to σn and obtain
∂Wn(κn, σn)
∂σn
= ρnVκnh(σn) · g(σn), (48)
where h(·) is the PDF of the data valuation θ and g(·) is
given by
g(σn) ,
1−H(σn)
h(σ)
− σn + cn
ρn
. (49)
Note that g(·) is a monotonically decreasing function if the
distribution of θ satisfies the IFR. In addition, we can show
that {
g(0) = +∞ > 0,
g(θmax) =
cn
ρn
− θmax < 0, (50)
which implies that there exists a unique σMPn satisfying
g
(
σMPn
)
= 0,
g (σn) > 0, if σn < σMPn ,
g (σn) < 0, if σn > σMPn .
(51)
Combining (48) and (51), we know that
∂Wn(κn, σn)
∂σn
= 0, if σn = σMPn ,
∂Wn(κn, σn)
∂σn
> 0, if σn < σMPn ,
∂Wn(κn, σn)
∂σn
< 0, if σn > σMPn ,
(52)
which indicates that the MNO-n maximizes its profit if its
threshold user type is σMPn , i.e.,
σMPn −
1−H(σMPn )
h(σMPn )
=
cn
ρn
. (53)

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Lemma 5 reveals the trade-off between the subscription
fee and the per-unit fee, i.e., the profit-maximizing subscrip-
tion fee ΠMPn and per-unit fee pi
MP
n need to satisfy
piMPn
(
β−1 − 1) (d¯− Vκn)+ ΠMPn = ρnVκnσMPn (κn). (54)
A larger piMPn would lead to a smaller Π
MP
n , and vice
versa.
Lemma 6. Under the optimal pricing strategy in Lemma 5,
a monopoly MNO-n obtains a higher profit under the rollover
mechanism (than the traditional mechanism T), i.e., κMPn = R.
Proof of Lemma 6 . Under the optimal pricing strategy
specified in Lemma 5, the MNO’s profit is given by
Wn(κn, σ
MP
n ) = ρnVκn
[
σMPn − cnρn
] [
1−H (σMPn ) ]. (55)
Since VR > VT, we know that Wn(R, σMPn ) > Wn(T, σ
MP
n ),
which indicates that κMPn = R. 
Lemma 6 shows that the monopoly MNO should select
the rollover mechanism R to maximize its profit. This conclu-
sion still holds under users’ two-dimensional heterogeneity
on data valuation and network substitutability. We refer
interested readers to our previous works in [8].
APPENDIX C
BERTRAND COMPETITION
In the main paper, we make Assumption 1 in Section
4 and Section 5. Now we consider the case of ξ(κ) = 1.
More specifically, we focus on showing that our analysis for
ξ(κ) 6= 1 (in Sections 4 and 5 of the main paper) is also
applicable to the case of ξ(κ) = 1 in terms of the market
partition and the MNOs’ best responses.
C.1 Market Partition
We summarize the user subscription equilibrium when
ξ(κ) = 1 in Theorem 6.
Theorem 6 (Market Partition for ξ(κ) = 1). Consider MNOs’
threshold user types σ1 and σ2 under the data mechanism κ =
{κ1, κ2} and the pricing strategy s = {s1, s2}. There are two
market competition results in the (σ1, σ2) plane shown in Fig.
13.
1) Σ1: MNO-1 has a larger threshold user type than MNO-2,
i.e., (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 where Σ1 is
(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1 , {(σ1, σ2) : σ1 > σ2}. (56)
In this case, MNO-2’s market share corresponds to the users
with θ in Φ2 = [σ2, θmax], while MNO-1 has a zero market
share Φ1 = ∅, as shown in Fig. 14(a).
2) Σ2: MNO-1 has a smaller threshold user type than MNO-2,
i.e., (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ2 where Σ2 is
(σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ2 , {(σ1, σ2) : σ1 < σ2}. (57)
In this case, MNO-1 has a market share of Φ1 = [σ1, θmax],
while MNO-2 has a zero market share of Φ2 = ∅, as shown
in Fig. 14(b).
By comparing Theorem 6 with Theorem 1, we find that
Theorem 6 is a special case of Theorem 1 if ξ(κ) = 1. That
σ1
σ2
O θmax
θmax
Σ1
Σ2
Fig. 13: Partition structure for ξ(κ) = 1.
-
-
-
(a) MNO-1 surviving (Σ2)
-
-
-
(b) MNO-2 surviving (Σ1)
Fig. 14: Two market partition modes when ξ(κ) = 1.
is, as ξ(κ) is approaching to 1, the gray region in Fig. 2 will
diminish and eventually becomes Fig. 13.
Next we study the best response of each MNO based on
the subscription equilibrium in Theorem 6.
C.2 Best Response
For ξ(κ) = 1, the two MNOs are symmetric, i.e.,
ρ1Vκ1 = ρ2Vκ2 . In this case, their best responses are the
same. Therefore, we will take MNO-2 as example by pre-
senting its best response to MNO-1 in Lemma 7
Lemma 7 (Best Response of MNO-2 for ξ(κ) = 1). Given
MNO-1’s threshold user type σ1, MNO-2 maximizes its profit
W2(κ,σ) by choosing a threshold user type σ∗2(κ, σ1) as follows:
σ∗2(κ, σ1) =

ψ2, if σ1 ∈ [0, θW1 ),
[σ1]
−, if σ1 ∈ [θW1 , θN1 ),
σMP2 (κ2), if σ1 ∈ [θN1 , θmax],
(58)
where [x]− denotes the value slightly lower than x.
Fig. 15(a) illustrates the MNO-2’s best response specified
in Lemma 7. Specifically, the red line segments (i.e., BR2-a,
BR2-b, and BR2-c) denote σ∗2(κ, σ1). Next we discuss the
physical meanings of the three different parts of the best
response in more details.
• BR2-a: MNO-2 gives up the competition and obtains a
zero market share, i.e., (σ1, σ∗2(σ1)) ∈ Σ2, if MNO-1
chooses a threshold user type smaller than its winning
threshold, i.e., σ1 ≤ θW1 .
• BR2-b: MNO-2 leaves a zero market to MNO-1, i.e.,
(σ1, σ
∗
2(σ1)) ∈ Σ1, by choosing a threshold user type
σ∗2(κ, σ1) slightly smaller than σ1, if MNO-1 chooses a
threshold user type between its winning and no-influence
thresholds, i.e., θW1 < σ1 < θ
N
1 .
• BR2-c: MNO-2 leaves a zero market to MNO-1 and
decides its threshold user type as in Appendix B without
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σMP2 (κ2)
ψ2
θW1
σ1
σ2
O θmax
θmax
BR2-a
BR2-b
BR2-c
σ∗2(κ,σ1)
(a) Illustration of σ∗2(κ, σ1).
σMP1 (κ1)ψ1
θN2
θW2
σ1
σ2
O θmax
θmax
BR1-a
BR1-b
BR1-c
σ∗1(κ,σ2)
(b) Illustration of σ∗2(κ, σ1).
Fig. 15: Illustration of the best responses for ξ(κ) = 1.
considering the existence of MNO-1, i.e., σ∗2(κ, σ1) =
σMP2 as defined in (53), if MNO-1 chooses a thresh-
old user type larger than its no-influence threshold, i.e.,
σ1 ≥ θN1 .
By comparing Lemma 7 with Lemma 1, we find that the
MNO-2’s best response under ξ(κ) = 1 is a special case of
that under ξ(κ) 6= 1. That is, the illustration in Fig. 4 will
become Fig. 15(a) as ξ(κ) is approaching to 1.
Furthermore, the best response of MNO-1 is similar to
Lemma 7, and we illustrate it in Fig. 15(b). For an easy
comparison with Fig. 15(a), in Fig. 15(b) we plot the best
response σ∗1(σ2) on the horizontal axis and the variable σ2
on the vertical axis.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Theorem 1 . We prove Theorem 1 by characteriz-
ing the conditions of the three market partitions. Recall that
the neutral user type σ˜ is
σ˜(σ1, σ2) =
σ1 − ξ(κ) · σ2
1− ξ(κ) . (59)
According to the illustration in Fig. 3(a), MNO-2 leaves
a zero market share to MNO-1 if and only if the neutral user
type is no smaller than the maximal data valuation of the user
group, i.e., σ˜(σ1, σ2) ≥ θmax. It is mathematically equivalent
to
σ1 − σ2 ≥ (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2), (60)
which corresponds to the set Σ1 in Theorem 1.
According to the illustration in Fig. 3(b), MNO-1 leaves a
zero market share to MNO-2 if and only if the threshold user
type of MNO-1 is no larger than that of MNO-2, i.e., σ1 ≤ σ2.
It corresponds to the set Σ2 in Theorem 1.
According to the illustration in Fig. 3(c), both the MNOs
obtain positive market shares if and only if the neutral user
type is smaller than the maximal data valuation of the user group
(i.e., σ˜ < θmax) and the threshold user type of MNO-1 is larger
than that of MNO-2 (i.e., σ1 > σ2). They are equivalent to
0 < σ1 − σ2 < (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2), (61)
which corresponds to the set Σ3 in Theorem 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof of the two MNOs’ best re-
sponses is similar, here we take MNO-1 as an example.
We prove Lemma 2 by characterizing the best response of
MNO-1 to MNO-2.
Based on Theorem 1, both the MNOs obtain positive
market shares if and only if
0 < σ1 − σ2 < (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2). (62)
The corresponding profit of MNO-1 is
W1(κ,σ) = ρ1Vκ1 [σ1 − ψ1]
[
1−H (σ˜(σ1, σ2))
]
. (63)
From (62), we can derive the following two inequalities
for the coexistence case regarding to σ1
σ1 > σ2, (64a)
σ1 < σ2 + (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2). (64b)
Based on (63), we take the first order derivative of
W1(κ,σ) with respect to σ1 and obtain
∂W1(κ,σ)
∂σ1
=ρ1Vκ1
[
1−H
(
σ1 − ξ(κ)σ2
1− ξ(κ)
)
− σ1 − ψ1
1− ξ(κ) · h
(
σ1 − ξ(κ)σ2
1− ξ(κ)
)]
.
(65)
From (65), we can see that ∂W1∂σ1 = 0 is equivalent to
g(σ1, σ2) = 0, (66)
where g(σ1, σ2) is
g(σ1, σ2) =
1−H
(
σ1−ξ(κ)σ2
1−ξ(κ)
)
h
(
σ1−ξ(κ)σ2
1−ξ(κ)
) − σ1 − ψ1
1− ξ(κ) . (67)
Furthermore, under the IFR condition, we can show
that g(σ1, σ2) is decreasing in σ1. Therefore, when both the
MNOs obtain positive market shares (i.e., the two inequali-
ties in (64) hold), we have
g(σ2 + (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2), σ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J(σ2)
< g(σ1, σ2) < g(σ2, σ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
K(σ2)
.
(68)
Specifically, J(σ2) and K(σ2) are given by
J(σ2) = −ξ(κ)σ2 − ψ1
1− ξ(κ) − θmax, (69)
K(σ2) =
1−H (σ2)
h (σ2)
− σ2 − ψ1
1− ξ(κ) . (70)
Note that both J(σ2) and K(σ2) decrease in σ2 under the
IFR condition.
Now we define θW2 , θ
L
2 , and θ
N
2 as follows
J(θW2 ) = 0, (71a)
K(θL2 ) = 0, (71b)
θN2 = σ
MP
1 (κ1), (71c)
and derive the best response of MNO-1 based on θW2 , θ
L
2 ,
and θN2 as follows
• If σ2 < θW2 , then g(σ1, σ2) > 0 for any σ1 ∈ [σ2, σ2 +
(1− ξ(κ))(θmax−σ2)], which means that MNO-1 should
give up the market competition and obtain zero market
share, i.e., σ∗1 = ψ1.
• If θW2 ≤ σ2 < θL2 , then there exists a unique σˆ1 ∈
[σ2, σ2 + (1− ξ(κ))(θmax − σ2)] such that g(σˆ1, σ2) = 0,
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which means that the both MNOs obtain positive market
shares, i.e., σ∗1 = σˆ1.
• If θL2 ≤ σ2 < θN2 , then g(σ1, σ2) < 0 for any σ1 ∈
[σ2, σ2 +(1−ξ(κ))(θmax−σ2)], which means that MNO-
1 can leave a zero market competition to MNO-2, i.e.,
σ∗1 = σ2.
• If σ2 ≥ θN2 , then MNO-1 can decide its threshold user
type as in Lemma 5 without considering the existence of
MNO-2, i.e., σ∗1 = σ
MP
2 (κ1).

APPENDIX E
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove Theorem 3 by deriving the
conditions under which one of the MNO obtains a zero
market share.
First, we derive the condition (i.e., the upper bound
of c1) under which MNO-2 cannot obtain a positive mar-
ket share no matter what data mechanism outcome κ =
{κ1, κ2}. According to Theorem 1, MNO-2 just obtains a
zero market share if σ1 = σ2. Therefore, we substitute
σ1 = σ2 = σ into the threshold equilibrium condition (28)
and obtain
H(σ) +
σ − ψ1
1− ξ(κ) · h(σ) = 1,
H(σ) = H(σ) + (σ − ψ2) · h(σ)
1− ξ(κ) .
(72)
After solving (72), we obtain
c1 = ρ1
 c2
ρ2
− (1− ξ(κ)) ·
1−H
(
c2
ρ2
)
h
(
c2
ρ2
)
 , (73)
which means that MNO-2 cannot obtain a positive market
share under the data mechanism outcome κ = {κ1, κ2} if
c1 < ρ1
 c2
ρ2
− (1− ξ(κ)) ·
1−H
(
c2
ρ2
)
h
(
c2
ρ2
)
 . (74)
Note that the right hand side of (74) increases in
ξ(κ) =
ρ2Vκ2
ρ1Vκ1
. Therefore, we substitute the data mechanisms
κ = {R, T} into the right hand side of (74) to derive
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) as follows
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) , ρ1
[
c2
ρ2
−
(
1− ρ2VTρ1VR
)
· 1−H
(
c2
ρ2
)
h
(
c2
ρ2
) ] . (75)
In this case, the data mechanism equilibrium of Game 2
is κ∗ = {R, Na} if c1 < CSingle1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2).
Second, we derive the condition (i.e., the upper bound
of c2) under which MNO-1 cannot obtain a positive mar-
ket share no matter what data mechanism outcome κ =
{κ1, κ2}. Since MNO-1 has the advantage on the QoS, when
MNO-1 just obtains zero market share, it is possible for
MNO-1 to attract the high valuation users under (R, R) or
the low valuation users under (T, R). Therefore, we have the
following two critical conditions that lead to a zero market
share for MNO-1:
• σ1 = ξ(κ)σ2 + (1− ξ(κ))θmax under κ = {R, R}.
• σ1 = σ2 under κ = {T, R}.
We substitute σ1 = ξ(κ)σ2 + (1 − ξ(κ))θmax and κ =
{R, R} into the threshold equilibrium condition (28) and
obtain
c2 = c1 − (ρ1 − ρ2)θmax − ρ2 ·
1−H
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
)
h
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
) . (76)
Similarly, we substitute σ1 = σ2 and κ = {T, R} into the
threshold equilibrium condition (28) and obtain
c2 = ρ2
[
c1
ρ1
−
(
1− ρ1VTρ2VR
)
· 1−H
(
c1
ρ1
)
h
(
c1
ρ1
) ] . (77)
Combining (76) and (77), we can get the upper bound
for MNO-2’s cost CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1) as follows:
C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1) = max
{
ρ2
[
c1
ρ1
−
(
1− ρ1VTρ2VR
)
· 1−H
(
c1
ρ1
)
h
(
c1
ρ1
) ] ,
c1 − (ρ1 − ρ2)θmax − ρ2 ·
1−H
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
)
h
(
c1−(ρ1−ρ2)θmax
ρ2
)
}
(78)
In this case, the data mechanism equilibrium of Game 2
is κ∗ = {Na, R} if c2 < CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1). 
Proof of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. In the proof of Theorem
3, we have explained the data mechanism equilibrium (33)
of Lemma 3 and (35) of Lemma 4. In the following we will
prove Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 by showing the equality (34)
and inequality (36), respectively.
We first prove Lemma 3 by showing that MNO-2 cannot
reduce MNO-1’s profit no matter what data mechanism it
adopts, i.e., W1(R, T) = W1(R, R) if c1 < C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2).
From c1 < C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2), we obtain
ψ1 < ψ2 −
(
1− ρ2VTρ1VR
)
· 1−H(ψ2)h(ψ2) . (79)
Moreover, Lemma 5 indicates that MNO-1’s optimal thresh-
old user type σMP1 (R) under the rollover mechanism κ1 = R
satisfies
σMP1 (R)− 1−H(σ
MP
1 (R))
h(σMP1 (R))
= ψ1. (80)
Combining (79) and (80) together, we obtain
σMP1 (R)− 1−H(σ
MP
1 (R))
h(σMP1 (R))
< ψ2 −
(
1− ρ2VTρ1VR
)
· 1−H(ψ2)h(ψ2)
< ψ2 − 1−H(ψ2)h(ψ2) ,
(81)
which implies ψ2 > σMP1 (R), since the data valuation θ
satisfies the IFR condition.
Now we have shown that ψ2 > σMP1 (R) if c1 <
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2). According to Theorem 2, it corresponds
to the MNO-1’s strong monopoly regime, i.e., (ψ1, ψ2) ∈
ΨSM1 . That is, MNO-2 cannot affect MNO-1’s profit, i.e.,
W1(R, T) = W1(R, R). Hence we have proved Lemma 3.
As for the case of c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1) in Lemma
4, we find that the condition c2 < C
Single
2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1) can-
not guarantee the MNO-2’s strong monopoly regime (i.e.,
MNO-2’s week monopoly regime is also possible), hence it
is possible for MNO-1 to reduce MNO-2’s profit by adopting
the rollover mechanism, i.e., W2(R, R) ≤W2(T, R). 
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APPENDIX F
Next we introduce how to compute the threshold val-
ues in the equilibrium structure of Game 2. We start with
introducing Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. In the coexistence case of Game 2, i.e., c1 ≥
C
Single
1 (ρ1, ρ2, c2) and c2 ≥ CSingle2 (ρ1, ρ2, c1), we have
W1(R, T) > W1(T, T). (82)
Proof of Lemma 8. Suppose the threshold equilibriums un-
der the data mechanisms κ = (T, T) and κ′ = (R, T) are
σ = {σ1, σ2} and σ′ = {σ′1, σ′2}, respectively. Under the
data mechanisms κ and κ′, MNO-1 always obtains the high
valuation users. Therefore, the profits of MNO-1 in the two
cases are
W1(κ,σ) = ρ1VT [σ1 − ψ1]
[
1−H(σ˜(κ,σ))], (83)
and
W1(κ
′,σ′) = ρ1VR [σ′1 − ψ1]
[
1−H(σ˜(κ′,σ′))]. (84)
In the following, we prove W1(κ,σ) < W1(κ′,σ′).
According to the definition of ξ in (14), we have
ξ(κ) > ξ(κ′). (85)
Based on the definition of the neutral user type in (15), the
inequality (85) implies that
σ˜(κ,σ) > σ˜(κ′,σ). (86)
Therefore, we have
W1(κ,σ) = ρ1VT [σ1 − ψ1]
[
1−H(σ˜(κ,σ))]
< ρ1VR [σ1 − ψ1]
[
1−H(σ˜(κ′,σ))] = W1(κ′,σ),
(87)
that it,
W1(κ,σ) < W1(κ
′,σ). (88)
According to the best response analysis discussed in
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know σn < σ′n for all n ∈ {1, 2}.
That is, both the MNOs can increase their threshold user
types (by charging higher subscription fee and per-unit fee)
if MNO-1 changes its data mechanism to rollover mecha-
nism R. Accordingly, based on the definition of the neutral
user type (15), we have
σ˜(κ′,σ) > σ˜(κ′, σ1, σ′2), (89)
which implies that
W1(κ
′,σ) < W1(κ′, σ1, σ′2). (90)
Recall that σ′ = {σ′1, σ′2} is the threshold equilibrium
(i.e., the fixed point of the MNOs’ best responses) under the
data mechanism κ′. Hence we have
W1(κ
′, σ1, σ′2) < W1(κ
′,σ′). (91)
Combining (88), (89), and (91), we obtain
W1(κ,σ) < W1(κ
′,σ′). (92)

Lemma 8 indicates that Game 2 never admits (T, T) as an
equilibrium. The other three outcomes {(T, R), (R, T), (R, R)}
are possible at the equilibrium, which depends on the
MNOs’ QoS ρ = {ρ1, ρ2} and costs c = {c1, c2}. Next we
characterize the conditions under which one of the outcome
in {(T, R), (R, T), (R, R)} becomes the equilibrium of Game
2. To emphasize the dependence of the data mechanism
equilibrium on the MNOs’ QoS and costs, we write MNO-
n’s profit as Wn(κ,ρ, c) for all n ∈ {1, 2}.
We first characterize MNO-1’s cost upper bound, de-
noted by CRoll1 (ρ, c2), below which MNO-1 tends to adopt
the rollover mechanism R. Mathematically, CRoll1 (ρ, c2)
solves W1(T, R,ρ, c) = W1(R, R,ρ, c) with respect to c1.
Similarly, we can derive MNO-2’s cost upper bound, de-
noted by CRoll2 (ρ, c1), below which MNO-2 tends to adopt
the rollover mechanism R. Mathematically, c2 = CRoll2 solves
W2(R, T,ρ, c) = W2(R, R,ρ, c) with respect to c2. Therefore,
the data mechanism equilibrium is κ∗ = {R, R} if{
c1 < C
Roll
1 (ρ, c2),
c2 < C
Roll
2 (ρ, c1).
(93)
Here the two inequalities in (93) hold simultaneously only
if the two MNOs’ has a relatively large QoS difference, i.e.,
ρ2 < ρ˜, where ρ˜ solves CRoll1 (ρ1, ρ˜, C
Roll
2 (ρ1, ρ˜, c1)) = c1.
Otherwise, if ρ2 ≥ ρ˜, then there is no ρ = {ρ1, ρ2}
and c = {c1, c2} satisfying the two inequalities in (93).
In this case, Game 2 admits the symmetric equilibrium
κ∗ = {(R, T), (T, R)} if{
c1 ≥ CRoll1 (ρ, c2),
c2 ≥ CRoll2 (ρ, c1).
(94)
APPENDIX G
DATA MECHANISM EQUILIBRIUM
Next we provide the numerical results for ρ2 ∈
{0.95, 0.99}.
G.1 Small QoS Advantage
MNO-1 has a small QoS advantage when ρ2 = 0.95 (i.e.,
ρ1 = 1 is a little larger than ρ2 = 0.95).
Similarly, we plot the data mechanism equilibrium κ∗
versus c1 in Fig. 16(a), and label κ∗ on the top of the figure.
Fig. 16(b) further simulates the corresponding profits under
the equilibrium κ∗.
Different from Fig. 10(a), in Fig. 16(a) we find that MNO-
1 does not always adopt the rollover mechanism R all the
time, which is the key difference from the case of ρ2 = 0.91
(shown in Fig. 10(a)). More specifically, as c1 increases, the
equilibrium varies from (R, T) to (T, R) through (R, R), which
implies that: as the high-QoS MNO-1’s QoS advantage di-
minishes owning to its increasing cost, (i) it would discard
the rollover mechanism R, since its QoS advantage is not
large enough; (ii) the competitor (MNO-2) will upgrade
from T to R to make more profit; (iii) in this progress, it is
possible for the two competitive MNOs to offer the rollover
mechanism simultaneously,
Similar to Fig. 10(b), in Fig. 16(b) we find that MNO-1
experiences a profit drop when MNO-2 changes its data
mechanism from T to R, i.e., c1 = 48 RMB/GB. MNO-2
experiences a profit jump when MNO-1 changes its data
mechanism from R to T, i.e., c1 = 50.5 RMB/GB.
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Fig. 16: Game 2 equilibrium when ρ2 = 0.95.
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Fig. 17: Impact of rollover mechanism on duopoly market.
Furthermore, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are also reflected
in Fig. 16(b) when c1 < 22 RMB/GB or c1 > 52 RMB/GB.
The key insights are similar to that we discussed for Fig.
10(b).
Fig. 17(a) plots MNO-1’s profit versus its cost c1 in four
scenarios. The two black curves without markers corre-
spond to MNO-1’s monopoly market under data mecha-
nism T and R. The blue circle curve corresponds to MNO-
1’s profit in the duopoly market under the equilibrium κ∗
shown in Fig. 16(a). Essentially, the blue circle curve is the
same as that in Fig. 16(b). The blue cross curve corresponds
to MNO-1’s profit in the duopoly market under fixed data
mechanisms (T, T). In this case, the MNOs only compete on
price (but not on the data mechanism choice). By comparing
the black curves with the blue curves, we find that the
market competition significantly reduces MNO-1’s profit.
By comparing the two blue curves with markers, we note
that the rollover mechanism significantly increases MNO-
1’s profit 342% (on average) in the market competition.
Fig. 17(b) plots MNO-2’s profit versus the cost c1 in
similar scenarios. Specifically, the two black curves without
markers correspond to MNO-2’s monopoly market. The two
red curves correspond to the cases in the duopoly market.
The red triangle curve is the same as that in Fig. 16(b).
The red cross curve corresponds to MNO-2’s profit in the
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Fig. 18: Game 2 equilibrium when ρ2 = 0.99.
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Fig. 19: Impact of rollover mechanism on duopoly market.
duopoly market under fixed data mechanisms (T, T). By
comparing the black curves with the red curves, we find
that the market competition significantly reduces MNO-
2’s profit. The profit decrement of MNO-2 is larger than
that of MNO-1, since MNO-1 has the QoS advantage and
attracts high-valuation users. By comparing the two red
curves with markers, we note that the rollover mechanism
increases MNO-1’s profit 248% (on average) in the market
competition.
G.2 Negligible QoS Advantage
MNO-1 has a negligible QoS advantage when ρ2 = 0.99
(i.e., ρ1 = 1 is almost the same as ρ2 = 0.99).
Similarly, we plot the data mechanism equilibrium κ∗
versus c1 in Fig. 18(a), and label κ∗ on the top of the
figure. We find that as MNO-1’s cost c1 increases, the equi-
librium changes from (R, T) to (T, R) through the symmet-
ric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)}. The symmetric equilibrium
{(R, T), (T, R)} is the key difference between ρ2 = 0.99
and ρ2 = 0.95. Specifically, the symmetric equilibrium
{(R, T), (T, R)} results from the two MNOs’ homogeneity
(due to the negligible QoS advantage and comparable costs).
That is, if the two MNOs are homogeneous, no matter who
chooses the rollover mechanism R, the competitor has to
choose the traditional mechanism T.
20
Fig. 18(b) plots the corresponding profits under the equi-
librium κ∗. When the symmetric equilibrium {(R, T), (T, R)}
emerge, i.e., 40 RMB/GB < c1 < 45.05 RMB/GB, we find
that no matter who adopts the rollover mechanism R, it
obtains higher profit than that when it adopts the traditional
mechanism T.
Fig. 19(a) and Fig. 19(b) plot MNO-1’s and MNO-2’
profits versus its cost c1 in four scenarios. The insights
are similar to the previous results. The rollover mechanism
increases MNO-1’s profit 452% (on average) and MNO-2’s
profit 391% (on average) in the market competition.
